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h i g h l i g h t s
• We investigate how wealth shocks influence retirement behaviour.
• We exploit dramatic UK asset price changes in 2008–09 as a source of wealth shocks.
• The median required delay to retirement to offset the wealth shock is 1.1 years.
• We find no evidence that these shocks affected the retirement plans of older workers.
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a b s t r a c t
This letter revisits the question of how wealth shocks influence retirement behaviour, exploiting the
dramatic changes in UK asset prices between 2008 and 2009 as a source of such shocks. We find no
evidence that the wealth shocks arising from this recent financial crisis affected the retirement plans
of older workers in England.
© 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.N1. Introduction
The question of howwealth shocks affect retirement behaviour
is much studied, but taken together the results of the literature
have been mixed.1 This letter aims to provide some fresh evidence
on this interesting question by using, as a source of unexpected
wealth shocks, the significant asset price changes associated with
the recent financial crisis.
Asset prices fell dramatically in the UK in the late 2000s: for
example, over the course of financial year 2008–09 the FTSE All
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Open access under CC BY-NC-Share index fell by one-third, while average house prices fell by
over 15%. This potentially resulted in a large shock to individu-
als’ wealth holdings. In particular, those close to retirement might
be especially affected since they have generally accumulated large
amounts of wealth, but have relatively little of their working lives
left during which to react.
This letter uses data from the English Longitudinal Study of Age-
ing (ELSA) from before and during the financial crisis to investigate
the relationship between wealth shocks and the retirement plans
of older workers. Overall we find no evidence that individuals have
planned to adjust to the wealth shocks experienced by delaying
their retirement.
Such a finding is in line with much of the recent US literature:
for example, Coile and Levine (2006) find little evidence that the
performance of stock market holdings since the 1980s has driven
retirement rates, Hurd et al. (2009) find no effect of the stock mar-
ket boom of the late 1990s on the difference between retirement
ages and prior expectations or on changes in expected retirement
ages, and in Britain Disney et al. (2010) find little evidence that
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through wealth effects over the past two decades. In terms of the
recent financial crisis, McFall (2011) identifies stock market per-
formance as having a small impact on retirement plans and Goda
et al. (2011) find a small effect of stock prices (but not fluctuations
in housing wealth) on expectations of future labour market be-
haviour. However, in the latter case the authors caution that this
finding does not generalise to previous time periods (Goda et al.,
2012), suggesting that it may not be the wealth shocks themselves
affecting expectations, but rather other factors associated with the
crisis that also correlate with asset prices.
2. Data and methods
ELSA is a longitudinal dataset broadly representative of the
household population of England aged 50 and over. The advantages
of using ELSA data for this work are twofold. The first is the breadth
and detail of the data: the ELSA survey collects detailed informa-
tion on the size and composition of wealth holdings, sufficient data
on the private pension membership of individuals to allow future
pension rights to be estimated, as well as a large amount of in-
formation on demographics, labour market circumstances, health
and individuals’ expectations about the future. In particular, for our
purposes, the survey asks employees aged below the state pension
age (SPA) ‘At what age would you like to retire?’. This means that
we can start to analyse the impact of recent wealth shocks on re-
tirement behaviour without having to wait for data on the actual
retirement decisions of these individuals to become available.
The second advantage is timing: interviews for the third wave
of ELSA were conducted between May 2006 and August 2007, and
for the fourth wave between June 2008 and July 2009. Given that
in the UK the dramatic fall in asset prices happened between late
2007 and early 2009, this means that interview data are available
for individuals from both before the effects of the financial crisis
were felt and after some or all of the effects were felt.
The basic methodology used is to compare the change in the
reported planned retirement age before and after the financial
crisis with the wealth shock experienced. We interpret the change
in an individual’s answer to the question ‘At what age would you
like to retire?’ between their 2006/07 and 2008/09 interviews
directly as the change in an individual’s planned retirement age.
While this is a convenient outcome to study, since we can look for
an impact ofwealth shocks immediately, it is important to consider
how individuals report their planned retirement age. If individuals
use a rule of thumb, such as just reporting their SPA (the earliest
age at which they can start to draw their state pension), then we
may not observe a change in the reported age at which they would
like to retire even if their subsequent retirement behaviour turns
out to have been affected. The distribution of reported planned
retirement ages in 2006/07 does exhibit significant focal ages: for
example, 34% of men reported wanting to retire at age 65 and 54%
of women reported wanting to retire at age 60, which correspond
to the male and female SPAs in the UK. However, it is also the case
that actual retirements in the UK are concentrated at these ages. To
the extent that this is driven by social norms or credit constraints,
this may in fact reduce the expected impact of wealth shocks on
both planned and actual retirement ages.
We observe reported wealth in both 2006/07 and 2008/09,
and so the wealth shock individuals experienced could be calcu-
lated simply as the difference between these. However, in part
this change in wealth will reflect anticipated active and passive
changes in wealth. In addition, this change might be endogenous,
not least because those who experienced a large shock to their
wealth might have already responded by saving more than they
might ordinarily have done. We therefore take the approach ofinstrumenting the change in reported wealth using a simulated
wealth shock.
This simulated wealth shock is calculated using individuals’
holdings of ‘exposed’ assets in 2006/07, and the change in the price
of those assets relative to assumed expectations between an in-
dividual’s two interview dates. Exposed assets are taken to be in-
vestments, propertywealth andunannuitised defined contribution
(DC) pension wealth. Individuals are assumed to have expected
the value of all these assets to grow in nominal terms by 5% per
year. The actual change in asset prices is taken to be given by the
FTSE All Share index for investments, the FTSE DCisions2 index
for DC pension wealth, regional house prices for owner-occupied
housing wealth, and average house prices in England for other
propertywealth. The shocks experienced therefore differ across in-
dividuals because of differing portfolio compositions and variation
in interview dates. This latter aspect is important in that it lends
some plausible exogeneity to the wealth shocks that individuals
are simulated to have experienced: the ELSA survey aims to in-
terview individuals at the same point in the fieldwork period in
each wave, but the initial distribution of individuals across inter-
view dates is random. This simulated wealth shock is free from en-
dogeneity concerns, but does suffer from measurement error. We
use only a broad portfolio decomposition and aggregate asset price
indices, and therefore the simulated wealth shock will differ from
the actual shock experienced due to heterogeneity in returns stem-
ming from finer differences in asset holdings. To the extent that
this is the case, our simulated wealth shock would be a weaker in-
strument, making it harder to detect any effect of wealth shocks on
retirement plans. However, as described later, standard tests reject
the problem of a weak instrument in this case.
Housing wealth is a particularly contentious issue in the UK.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals do not perceive their
owner-occupied home to be a source of wealth that should be
drawn on to fund consumption. Individuals’ attitudesmight, there-
fore, be best described in a mental accounting framework,3 with
pension wealth and perhaps financial wealth perceived as being
for funding consumption, while housing wealth is perceived as a
stock of wealth that will be left as a bequest. In such a framework,
the response to any wealth shock experienced would be expected
to depend heavily on the type of wealth affected.We therefore also
investigate shocks to wealth excluding owner-occupied housing
wealth.
To formalise our methodology, consider the standard intertem-
poral budget constraint, where at any given time t , the sum of the
present discounted value of potential future employment income
(wageswt , multiplied by time endowment normalised to one), the
present discounted value of future pension income given a planned
retirement age of R and future accrual of state and private pension
rights until that time (Pt R) and current assets (At) must equal the
sumof the present discounted value of future consumption (ct), in-
tended bequests (B), and pre- and post-retirement leisure ((1− h)
and 1 respectively).
ΣDτ=t(1/(1+ r))τ
−t
wτ + Pt R + At
= ΣDτ=t(1/(1+ r))τ
−t
cτ+(1/(1+ r))D−τ B
+ΣRτ=t(1/(1+ r))τ
−t
wτ (1− h)+ΣDτ=R(1/(1+ r))τ
−t
wτ .
The financial crisis can be considered as a one-off shock to holdings
of financial wealth, property wealth and private pension wealth
2 The FTSE DCisions index is an index of total fund return (in other words,
it assumes that any dividends are reinvested) that reflects the asset allocation
decisions made by leading DC pension plans in their default investment strategies.
3 Along the lines of Shefrin and Thaler (1988).
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budget constraint, individuals must respond to such a shock by
reducing expenditure on consumption, bequests or leisure. In par-
ticular, individuals could respond by delaying their planned retire-
ment age (R).
Akin to McFall (2011), in this letter we express the wealth
shocks in terms of the number of extra years an individual would
need to work in order to keep expenditure on consumption and
bequests unchanged:
shock = R˙− R where R˙ is such that
P R˙t − Pt R +Σ R˙τ=R(1/(1+ r))τ
−t
wτh = −(1Pt R +1At).
This is a natural metric for the size of the wealth shock when con-
sidering changes in retirement plans.
The econometric specification used is1R = α+β1Rˇ+ε, where
1R is the change in the reported planned retirement age and 1Rˇ
is the change in reported wealth instrumented by the change in
simulated wealth, both expressed in terms of the required delay to
retirement. The coefficient β is easily interpretable: β = 1 implies
that individuals adjust to wealth shocks fully on the retirement
margin, β = 0 implies that retirement plans are unresponsive to
wealth shocks,while 0 < β < 1 implies a partial response through
retirement timing. A constant term α is included to capture any
trend change in retirement plans as people age, or any general ef-
fects of the financial crisis aside from the specific wealth shocks
experienced. This specification is estimated using local linear re-
gression (a methodology introduced by Cleveland (1979) and de-
veloped by Cleveland and Devlin (1988)) to allow for a non-linear
relationship between wealth shocks and retirement responses.
3. Results
The distribution of the wealth shocks that individuals are simu-
lated to have experienced between 2006/7 and 2008/9, expressed
in terms of the required delay to retirement in order to keep con-
sumption and bequests unchanged, is shown in Fig. 1. The median
simulated required delay to retirement is 1.1 years, with one quar-
ter of individuals simulated to have experienced a wealth shock
equivalent to a delay in retirement of less than 0.4 years, and
one quarter of individuals simulated to have experienced a wealth
shock equivalent to a delay in retirement of 3.2 years or more.
If changes in the value of the owner-occupied main home are
excluded, the simulated wealth shocks are on average small—the
median wealth shock is simulated to be equivalent to a delay to
retirement of just 0.2 years. This is because, while older individuals
in the UK hold relatively large amounts of wealth, the largest
single component ofwealth is normally the owner-occupied home.
Individuals aged between 50 and the SPA in these cohorts tend to
hold little wealth in DC pensions, investments or other financial
assets thatwould have been exposed tomovements in asset prices.
Fig. 2 reports the main result from the local linear regression
analysis. There is little evidence that individuals responded to the
wealth shock they are estimated to have experienced by delaying
their retirement plans—the estimated coefficient β from Eq. (3) is
consistently around zero. Since this relationship is also apparently
linear, greater precision can be obtained by using simple linear
regression and utilising the whole sample to estimate a single β .
4 This assumes that the financial crisis had no effect on the future return on assets
or on employment prospects. Evidence from the Annual Survey of Earnings and
Hours suggests that in Great Britain the wages and employment of those aged 50
and over was in fact relatively unaffected between 2007 and 2010.Doing so yields an estimatedβ of zero, surrounded bymuch tighter
confidence bands. The standard test for weak instruments is also
performed, and can be rejected (the first stage F-statistic is 164,
well above the critical value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock
(1997) for the case of one endogenous variable).
The lack of a response through delaying retirement plans is also
found to be true of subgroups of individuals whomight be thought
more likely to respond to wealth shocks by delaying retirement,
such as those with a younger partner (who might be less averse
to postponing their retirement if their partner is also still in work)
and those who are not yet close to their planned retirement age
(who might have a lower mental adjustment cost associated with
delaying retirement).
When we exclude losses from owner-occupied housing wealth
local linear regression analysis is less advantageous since there is
less variation in wealth shocks across individuals (shown for the
simulated wealth shocks in Fig. 1). Simple linear regression analy-
sis of the relationship between the change in planned retirement
age and the instrumentedwealth shock excluding owner-occupied
housing again yields an estimated β of essentially zero (−0.07).
This is, however, much less precisely estimated, with a 95% confi-
dence interval of−0.38 to+0.28.
4. Conclusions
The results in this letter suggest that individuals aged 50 and
over in England did not respond to the wealth shocks they experi-
enced as a result of the financial crisis by changing their planned re-
tirement age. There are two potential caveats to this finding. First,
it is possible that individuals had not realised the extent of their
wealth shock by the time of their 2008/09 interview. Alternatively,
they may have believed that asset prices would be mean reverting
and therefore that their simulated wealth shock would be tem-
porary (Christelis et al. (2011) suggest that this is the case for a
non-trivial fraction of households in the US). However, the find-
ings of Banks et al. (2012) suggest that individuals did respond to
thewealth shocks associatedwith the financial crisis on othermar-
gins, such as consumption and expected bequests.
Our finding of little association between wealth shocks and
changing retirement plans is in line with the findings of much
of the recent literature that has investigated the effect of asset
price changes on retirement behaviour and expectations (cf. Coile
and Levine (2006), Hurd et al. (2009), Disney et al. (2010), McFall
(2011) and Goda et al. (2011)). However, that is not to suggest that
wealth shocks never affect retirement decisions. First, the wealth
shocks generated by asset price movements—particularly when
owner-occupied housing is excluded—may be too small to induce a
detectable effect on retirement timing, particularly if such an ad-
justment is associatedwith fixed costs. Second, individualsmay re-
spond asymmetrically to positive and negativewealth shocks,with
perhaps the former having a greater influence on retirement tim-
ing than the latter. This could reconcile our findings with some of
the other existing literature, for example Brown et al. (2010) who
find that large unexpected inheritances have a positive effect on
retirement probabilities.
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